Zur patientenorientierten Behandlung bei nichteinwilligungsfähigen Patienten werden aktuell der Einbezug oder auch die Entscheidung durch ein Ethikkonsil oder klinisches Ethikkomitee (KEK) gefordert. Damit die Entscheidung des Entscheidungsträgers durch das KEK unterstützt werden kann, müssen Zuständigkeiten, Besetzung und Arbeitsweise des Gremiums klar umschrieben sein.

The present article aims to explain Kamala??la’s understanding of the nature of insight, specifically considering it as the ‘discernment of reality’ -- a technical term identified with insight in the author’s well known Bh?van?krama? texts. I approach my analysis of bh?ta-pratyavek?? from three different angles. I begin by providing a rationale for its translation. This is followed by an account of Kamala??la’s reading of key passages in the La?k?vat?ra S?tra describing the process to which the term refers. Here the aim (...) is to illustrate Kamala??la’s understanding of bh?ta-pratyavek?? as it is actually experienced in meditation. The final section examines bh?ta-pratyavek?? in relation to other important technical terminology employed in the course of making arguments against his historical rival in debate, the Ch’an monk Mo ho yen. By providing these three different perspectives on the same process it is my hope that both scholars and practitioners will be able to more fully comprehend and benefit from the instructions provided by the ancient master Kamala??la. (shrink)

A theory of punishment should tell us not only when punishment is permissible but also when it is a duty. It is not clear whether McCloskey's retributivism is supposed to do this. His arguments against utilitarianism consist largely in examples of punishments unacceptable to the common moral consciousness but supposedly approved of by the consistent utilitarian. We remain unpersuaded to abandon our utilitarianism. The examples are often fanciful in character, a point which (pace McCloskey) does rob them of much of (...) their force. If there was no tension between utilitarian precepts and those which come naturally to plain men, utilitarianism could have no claim to provide a critique of moralities. The utilitarian's attitude to such tensions is somewhat complicated, but what is certain is that there is more room in his system for the sentiments to which McCloskey appeals against him than McCloskey realizes. We agree with McCloskey, however, on the absurdity of substituting rule?utilitarianism for act?utilitarianism as an answer to his attacks. The distinction itself may represent a conceptual confusion. In our view, indeed, unmodified act?utilitarianism provides the best moral basis for thought about punishment. (shrink)

Numerous accounting and economics research studies employ an experimental research method requiring student participants to make representations about an individual characteristic (e.g., ability, cost) that provides a basis for payment of cash rewards. In response, many participants intentionally misrepresent the nature of that characteristic to receive a greater reward. Typically, such studies are deemed to be either exempt from review by institutional review boards (IRBs) or subject only to an expedited review. Moreover, investigators seldom debrief participants, purportedly to avoid contamination (...) of the participant pool. The authors question the ethics of inducing strategic misrepresentation and rewarding fraudulent behavior without appropriate debriefing. A theoretical framework of cognitive ethical development indicates that such research methods can be harmful to student participants. Furthermore, principles of operant conditioning suggest that the rewards reinforce fraudulent behavior. It is recommended that research studies inducing strategic misrepresentation should not be exempt from IRB review and should be required to include desensitization procedures for debriefing participants. (shrink)

Singer’s utilitarian and Regan’s deontological views must be rejected because: (1) they rely on criteria for moral standing that can only be known a priori and (2) if these criteria were successful, they’d be too restrictive. I hold that while mental properties may be sufficient for moral standing, they are not necessary. (3) Their criteria of moral standing do not unambiguously abrogate needless harm to animals. I defend a theory of biocentric individualism that upholds the principle of species egalitarianism while (...) at the same time recognizing that in certain cases, human needs must outweigh the needs of non-humans. On this view, moral consideration is not conferred only on beings that have human-like mental properties. Finally, it offers an unambiguous recommendation for the abolition of harmful animal experimentation, factory farming, and killing animals for sport. (shrink)

The philosophers' tendency to characterize euthanasia in terms of either the right or the responsibility to die is, in some ways, problematic. Stepping outside of the analytic framework, the author draws out the implications of the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas for the euthanasia debate, tracing the way Levinas's position differs not only from the philosophical consensus but also from the theological one. The article shows that, according to Levinas, there is no ethical case for suicide or assisted suicide. Death cannot (...) be assumed or chosen-not only because suicide is a logically and metaphysically contradictory concept but also because in the choice of death ethical responsibility turns into irresponsibility. However, since Levinas holds that one must be responsible to the point of expiation, he can be said to approve certain actions that may have the consequence of hastening death. (shrink)

Singer's study of the technical problems of Santayana's systematic thought will not satisfy his friends nor his detractors. Her reduction of Santayana's Lucretian materialism to epiphenomenalism will seem inadequate to the former. The latter may see Santayana as merely technically inept. While Singer does not claim to offer a comprehensive study of Santayana's thought, her theses " that Santayana was a naturalist and a materialist in the same sense and on the same grounds throughout; that despite even radical changes in (...) terminology his 'later' ontology is a development of, and not inconsistent with, his 'earlier' philosophy; and that, nevertheless, from the start his materialism was touched with ambiguity", do need a comprehensive understanding of Santayana's materialism. The "ambiguities" of his materialism and his social theory in Dominations and Powers derive from the ontological complexities of his realms of Being. Santayana plays with the perspectives possible from each realm and Singer sometimes misses his viewpoint. Santayana's challenge to the liberalism of democracy is indeed based on his a-teleological materialism. Singer's study does draw attention to the analogy of the individual to the state implicit in Santayana's philosophy; she offers refutations of M. K. Munitz's theory of "early and "late" Santayana and W. K. Dennes' interpretation of Santayana's materialism.--A. T. (shrink)

We are printing in its entirety the discussion document which sets out a code of professional conduct for nurses published by the Royal College of Nursing in November 1976 together with commentaries by the Assistant Secretary of the British Medical Association, a professor of nursing studies, student nurses and a lawyer. The image of the nurse is still that of one of Florence Nightingale's young ladies or of a member of a religious order who is wholly dedicated to caring for (...) the sick. Today, as this document and the comments upon it show, 'dedication' is still part of the motive which leads a man or woman to become a nurse but in addition, and this is where the public may be ignorant or choose to be ignorant, nursing offers a career where intellectual achievement and the satisfaction of a demanding job bring their proper financial reward and place in the professional community. We are grateful to the Royal College of Nursing for permission to publish this document. (shrink)

In matters such as affirmative action or home schooling, rights of ethnic and other minority groups often come into conflict with those of society in a culturally diverse population such as ours. But before considering the dilemmas posed by these issues, we must first ask such basic but important questions as what group rights are and how they intersect with the principles of democracy. This new collection brings together some of today's leading thinkers from the cutting edge of these debates, (...) taking in a broad range of issues confronting philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists. Contributors such as Carl Wellman, Carol Gould, and Rex Martin examine the nature of groups and the conflict between group rights and democracy and also consider case studies depicting current issues in cultural, ethnic, and religious rights. The first section, on the nature of groups, examines some of the perplexing alternatives in the formulation of a theory of group rights. These articles investigate the kinds of rights minorities might claim and ask when groups can be held responsible for the acts of some of their members. The second section addresses the treatment of groups in a democracy and the precarious balance between indifference toward minorities and capitulation to their demands. Here the contributors examine five principles for the sensitive treatment of minority and disadvantaged groups in a democratic society. A final section explores specific conflicts between subgroup and societal claims through case studies dealing with affirmative action, religious practice and the education of children, and the land rights of indigenous peoples. By drawing on the legal and political dilemmas related to these cases, the authors confront issues of core versus peripheral interests, of individual member versus subgroup rights, and of the possibilities for social openness raised in the preceding sections Written from varied perspectives, Groups and Group Rights offers stimulating reading for both students and professionals as it takes on some of the most pressing dilemmas confronting our society. (shrink)

The author sets himself the problem of justifying the moral ought. Moral theorists since Hume have argued that an ought can only be derived from another ought. Utilitarians say we ought to maximize the good, but cannot say why. Intuitionists claim the ought is self evident, but cannot deal satisfactorily with differing intuitions. The failure of the major traditions of Western moral philosophy to successfully explain why we ought to act in certain ways has led to ethical skepticism and moral (...) cynicism. Johnson aims to prove that a self-justifying ought is meaningful and does exist, and that a moral ought can be derived from it. The basis of his proof is the self-justifying nature of the obligation to be rational, which is absolute because no rational argument can be made for irrationality. From this rational ought he develops a moral ought containing the obligation to treat everyone impartially and to promote the happiness of others to the same extent as our own. Thus the question "Why ought I to be moral?" is subsumed under "Why ought I to be rational?", which in turn answers itself. Everyone has an equal right to happiness, and thus an equal claim to be treated impartially, but may waive the claim in particular circumstances. The most common reason for such a waiver is the belief that we can promote our own happiness more effectively in the long run by frequently waiving our claim to equal treatment than by always insisting on it. The author's ultimate conclusion--to maximize happiness and divide it equally among everyone affected by one's actions--is hardly distinguishable from Mill's utilitarianism, but it is reached by severely logical rather than empirical reasoning. The work is a closely argued but ultimately unconvincing effort to provide a theoretical basis for morality.--A. T. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:26. DAVID HUME ON REASON, PASSIONS AND MORALS Perhaps the most notorious passage in Hume's Treatise is the one that concerns the relative roles of reason and passions, where he says: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions (T 415). This psychology of action is the foundation of Hume's moral theory, wherein we find his two other notorious dicta, one being!.¡oral distinctions cannot be (...) derived from reason, and the other, Ought cannot be derived from is. Many commentators have interpreted Hume as saying that reason plays no role in the making of moral judgments, and, while not taking the rationalistic line, criticized him for not giving reason its proper due. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's primary concern is to argue against the rationalist position which takes reason to be sufficient (always or sometimes) to move one to act, and to give rise to moral judgments. I wish to show that Hume is only concerned with dismissing the claim that reason could be a sufficient condition, not that it is a necessary one. Indeed, Hume could be interpreted as saying that reason is no less important than passions in shaping human conduct, anc in the area of inorai conduct, there can be no moral judgments without the work of reason. At the same time, however, passions remain the prime mover; reason does not move us to act (generally, hence morally). 1 shall try to show that the dictum '¿¡oral distinctions cannot be derived from reason' is essentially correct, but its being correct in no way shows that reason is not a necessary element of moral distinctions. 27. Before discussing the views of some critics of Hume's moral theory, it is important to clear up one source of misunderstanding that lies in Hume's discussion of the psychology of action. When Hume says that reason is the slave of passions, he does not say thereby that reason is unimportant. He is saying merely that reason alone does not move one to act. The force that propels one to action is the passion, whether it be love, or anger, or pride, or envy, or fear, or desire. Reason alone does not provide the motive. However, it is reason that does the groundwork, analyzing facts, perceiving relations, and drawing conclusions, all of which go to determine which action to perform, but the action will not be performed unless one of the passions is also present. Just because reason is the slave does not indicate that its work is not relevant. To extend the slavery metaphor, we may observe that slave owners supported slavery for the very reason that the slave's work was found indispensable; analogously, it must be observed that Hume is most unlikely to hole that reason plays no part in human action. To complete the analogy, we should say that while much could be achieved with slaves, it was the masters who conceived the plan, and the masters must rank higher in the causal order. We may observe further that greater achievement could be had by treating slaves properly, not overworking them, and not ill-treating them. If reason is the slave, it will be in our interest to cultivate it, sharpen it, and use it always and to the full. This could be inferred from HuTr.e's discussion of the understanding in Book 1 of the Treatise. indeed, in the conclusion of Book I, Hume points out forcefully that we contradict ourselves if we hold that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be 28. receiv'd (T 268). For it is only through reasoning that we arrive at any such conclusion. He goes on to say: Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction (T268). There cannot be a clearer demonstration that it is not the case that Hume fails to give reason its proper due. Later, I shall cite further evidence for this in relation specifically to the role of reason in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:141. ON HARRISON'S INTERPRETATION OF TREATISE III ii 1 In Treatise III ii 1, Hume is concerned to argue that justice is an artificial virtue, not a natural one. Commenting on this Section, Jonathan Harrison has pointed out that, on his reading and interpretation, Hume's argument runs into many difficulties. I shall argue in this paper that a more sympathetic reading of Hume will show that his argument is (...) a whole lot more plausible than Harrison takes it to be. Harrison raises many separate points, but instead of taking up these points one by one, I shall concentrate on one that seems to be most serious, and to lie at the heart of his criticism. The point is as follows. Hume's argument, designed to prove that justice is an artificial virtue as opposed to natural, proves too much: '(It) proves that justice is not a virtue at all' (HTJ 6). According to Harrison, Hume's first premise is [1] That actions are not duties unless there is in the mind of man a motive which normally prompts him to perform them, and the second premise is [2] That there is in the mind of man no motive which normally prompts him to perform just actions ( ibid. ) Harrison goes on to argue that we can derive from these two premises the 'embarrassing conclusion' that 'it cannot be a duty to perform just actions,' or that 'justice is not a virtue at all.' If Hume did indeed assert [1] and [2], the embarrassing conclusion would seem to follow. I shall argue that there is more than meets the eye as regards [1], and that Hume does not assert [2], 142. It would appear that in attributing [1] to Hume, Harrison has the following passage in mind: (It) may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality (T 479). As I interpret this passage, the main point of the maxim is that the virtuousness of an action resides not in the sense of the morality of the action, as this is clearly circular, but in some other motive. This maxim does imply [1] above provided that we take Harrison's 'actions are not duties' to mean 'actions are not virtuous,' and his 'motive' to mean 'motive other than a sense of duty or morality.' In general, however, Harrison's way of rendering the passage above is quite unsatisfactory because it obscures what Hume means by 'duty' and what for Hume renders an action virtuous. To clarify matters, we need to look more closely at Hume's maxim. The first thing to note is that, while it is not clear what Harrison means by 'motive, ' Hume clearly uses the term 'motive' to mean 'passion.' Hume talks about 'the motives that produced' actions (T 477, my emphasis). Given Hume's psychology of actions, it is obvious that Hume is talking about the passions that produced actions. The sense of morality or duty, or the moral sentiment, is itself a passion which is capable of producing actions, and can do so 'without any other motive' (T 479). However, what Hume stresses in the passage above is that it is not the sense of duty that gives an action a good moral character, but some other motive, or passion. Hume is saying that the sense of duty is a derivative passion: an action has to 143, be established as virtuous in the first place for there to be a sense of duty concerning that action, or a sense of its morality; and it has to be so established by some other motive of which the sense of duty can be said to be derivative. Hume spells this out explicitly when he talks about humane actions. Thus, it is the humanity that 'bestows a merit on the actions' (T 478), not a regard to this merit, or a sense of duty concerning the actions, which is 'deriv'd from the antecedent principle of humanity' ( ibid., my emphasis). Now a sense of duty or obligation has to be distinguished from... (shrink)

Having explicated "refraining," "omitting," "failing" and "letting happen," it is argued that these cases are not actions but decisions, Having consequences for which one may be blamed or praised. To blame or praise properly we need a clear concept of responsibility. Extending h l a hart's "role-Responsibility," it is suggested that there are "official, Causal" and "casual" role-Responsibilities. The first two involve some people's rights--The last does not--And not discharging them is more serious.

Over the last ten years or so, John Stuart Mill’s position on paternalism has been thoroughly re-examined by philosophers. The majority view now seems to be that it is unreasonable to rule out paternalism altogether. The argument is often couched in vaguely utilitarian terms: the benefit of a particular paternalistic measure may so clearly outweigh the disadvantage, if there is any, that it is utterly unreasonable to object to it. For instance, it is unreasonable to object to a law enforcing (...) the wearing of seat belts when driving, given the enormous benefits and the minor irritation of having to conform. (shrink)

Objective: To determine cryopreservation-induced alterations in the cytoskeleton of metaphase II mouse oocytes and the implications of these alterations in functionality of the cytoskeleton and polyploidy after fertilization.Design: Comparative study.Setting: Clinical and academic research environment at a medical school teaching hospital.Intervention : Oocytes were frozen using a slow-cooling and slow-thawing protocol in 1.5 M dimethyl sulfoxide and 0.2 M sucrose and were analyzed before and after fertilization.Main Outcome Measure : Cytoskeletal alterations, fertilization, and polyploidy rates.Result : When analyzed immediately after (...) thawing, the oocytes displayed dramatic cytoskeletal alterations. Only slight recovery was observed upon removal of the cryoprotectants. However, incubation after thawing of 1 hour at 37oC completely reestablished a normal microfilament and microtubule pattern while partially restoring normal spindle morphology and chromosome alignment. Accordingly, insemination immediately after removal of cryoprotectants resulted in a significantly decreased fertilization rate and aberrant dynamics of cytoskeleton-dependent events, whereas oocytes inseminated after the post-thaw incubation displayed fertilization rates and cytoskeletal dynamics comparable to those in controls. Cryopreservation did not increase polyspermy but significantly increased digyny when the oocytes were inseminated after the post-thaw incubation. All digynic eggs displayed an abnormal spindle remnant in comparison with diploid or polyspermic eggs.Conclusion : A brief period of incubation after thawing allows recovery and positively affects fertilization and cytoskeletal dynamics. Cryopreservation does not impair the functionality of microfilaments and cytoplasmic microtubules during postfertilization events. Our findings suggest that the increased rate of digyny in cryopreserved oocytes may be related to the spindle disorganization, leading to failure in segregation of the chromosomes, rather than to direct malfunction of the microfilaments in polar body formation. (shrink)

I AM glad that Dr. Fotheringham in the interesting paper which appeared in the Classical Quarterly adhered to the view that ‘Caesar calculated the new moon for January 1 [45 B.C]…and that this calculation determined the inaugural day of the Julian calendar.’ As the object of my brief note, on which he commented, was merely to show that Groebe had failed to prove that the day in question was January 2, I have only a few questions to ask. But first, (...) in justice to Judeich, I ought to say that his calculations, which Dr. Fotheringham notices, were made with the help of the assistant-astronomer attached to the observatory of the University of Strassburg. While Dr. Fotheringham admits that I was right in maintaining that the new moon of January 2, 45 B.C. was not visible on the evening of that day, he holds that Groebe was ‘fairly entitled to say’ that the new moon of March 24, 58 B.C. , was visible on March 25. Dr. Fotheringham may be justified in saying that it ought ‘in normal [or abnormally fine ?] weather to have been visible that evening’; but, as I observed in my note, Groebe affirmed that in calculating the time of visibility of the crescent we should accept the mean of the Babylonian estimates, 36 hours—less, I should have added, in the early spring and the winter, more in the summer and autumn. Was he entitled to deduct 9 hours from the mean for an observation made not in the clear atmosphere of the East, but in Switzerland? Dr. Fotheringham tells us that ‘the shortest interval between a new moon and the observation of the moon by Schmidt's naked eye comes’ not, as Groebe said, to 29, but ‘to 25.7 hours.’ But forty-eight of Schmidt's forty-nine observations were made at Athens, where the atmosphere is clearer than in Switzerland. The great difference in visibility which a clear atmosphere makes must strike everyone who goes from this country or from Switzerland to the East or to Northern Africa. I realized it for the first time when I was exploring in Tunisia before the war. Has Dr. Fotheringham or any other trustworthy observer ever seen with the naked eye in an atmosphere no clearer than that of Geneva a moon not more than 27 hours old? If so, is it not remarkable that, as Dr. Fotheringham has said, ‘Hitherto it has been the practice to assume that [in the early spring or the winter and in favourable weather ?] the moon becomes visible on the first evening when she is more than 30 hours old at sunset’? (shrink)

We investigated the relationship between guilt proneness and counterproductive work behavior (CWB) using a diverse sample of employed adults working in a variety of different industries at various levels in their organizations. CWB refers to behaviors that harm or are intended to harm organizations or people in organizations. Guilt proneness is a personality trait characterized by a predisposition to experience negative feelings about personal wrongdoing. CWB was engaged in less frequently by individuals high in guilt proneness compared to those low (...) in guilt proneness, controlling for other known correlates of CWB. CWB was also predicted by gender, age, intention to turnover, interpersonal conflict at work, and negative affect at work. Given the detrimental impact of CWB on people and organizations, it may be wise for employers to consider guilt proneness when making hiring decisions. (shrink)

sirDr Campbell presents proponents of euthanasia with a dilemma.1 Only voluntary euthanasia is permissible; involuntary euthanasia is always impermissible. The question of allowing euthanasia arises most frequently when patients are terminally ill and experiencing great pain. But in these cases, he argues, if patients request euthanasia, their decision “is not freely chosen but is compelled by the pain”.2 It is easy to exaggerate the problem here; patients may have periods when they are pain-free and affirm repeatedly their desire that death (...) be hastened. Putting this aside, however, what should we conclude if euthanasia performed on patients who are suffering greatly is not voluntary?Dr Campbell concludes: “If the request to end one's life is not made freely, then it is doubtful that such requests ought to be followed”.2 An advance directive will not help, we are …. (shrink)

The claims that Dr. F. H. George makes on behalf of his machines are obscurely stated. Does he claim that a machine has been made and has actually produced a kind of response which is incalculable, given the specification to which it has been built and also the prescribed conditions, what is put in for the particular performance in question? “Incalculable” does not mean that nobody has bothered to calculate, but that somebody has bothered, that the calculations show that the (...) response in question is not among the calculated ones, that it is not chance or mechanical breakdown, but a specific response to something specific among the given conditions. If he could substantiate this claim, then I would reluctantly agree that some machines are cleverer and more thoughtful than I thought possible, and some men sillier and less thoughtful, for they deliberately design machines to do they know not what. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:European Network of Buddhist-Christian StudiesSalzburg, Austria, June 8–11, 2007John D’Arcy MayIs it a problem for Buddhists that what is generally regarded as religion can be profoundly different from tradition to tradition? Is it appropriate or even desirable to speak of a Buddhist “theology of religions”? Does Buddhism have its own ways, however subtle, of affirming its superiority over all else that claims the name “religion”?The European Network of Buddhist-Christian (...) Studies set out to find answers to these questions at its seventh conference, held at the splendid Catholic conference center of St. Virgil on the outskirts of Salzburg, Austria.Given the demographic realities in Europe, the network has inevitably tended to be a group of Christians discussing Buddhism, as far as possible with the participation of Buddhist guests but without really providing a platform for a thoroughgoing Buddhist discussion of religious plurality. This time, more Buddhists than ever before, including significant scholars from America and Asia as well as Europe, participated in the conference. We were thus treated to a discussion of Buddhist attitudes to the religions that broke new ground and presented a vivid picture of Buddhism’s own internal diversity.In his introductory address the president of the network, Prof. John May, paid tribute to the University of Salzburg’s newly established Centre for Intercultural Theology and the Study of Religions, whose director, Prof. Gregor Maria Hoff, welcomed participants on behalf of the university. Dr. Ulrich Winkler contributed substantially to the organization of the conference.Dr. Kristin Kiblinger (Winthrop University), author of the first systematic treatment of Buddhist “inclusivism,” opened the conference proper by distinguishing between “open” and “closed” forms of inclusivism. She suggested a parallel with George Lindbeck’s “experiential-expressive” paradigm of religious doctrine in order to make clear that Buddhists, like Christians, have ways of privileging their own positions, though these generally remain unacknowledged.“One vehicle” (ekayāna) theories of Buddhism have something in common with “common core” theories of Christian pluralism in that they presuppose a “single end” [End Page 149] inclusivism. Whether the “positionless position” derived from Buddhist “emptiness” (śūnyatā) is a better guarantee of genuine pluralism than the Christian notion of “self-emptying” (kenōsis), as suggested by Masao Abe, remains an open question. The Buddhist doctrine of “two truths,” one expressed in the “higher” language (paramārthasatya) accessible only to Buddhist practitioners and the other in the “lower” language (samvrtisatya) of discourse with others, does not hold out much promise of true mutual respect between traditions.Prof. John Makransky (Boston College), an ordained lama and meditation teacher as well as a renowned scholar of Tibetan Buddhism, took up the challenge of developing a Buddhist “theology” that avoids the claim to superiority. What matters to the Buddhist practitioner is to cut through all subconscious clinging, even to approved teachings and spiritual results. “Ultimate truth” can be known, directly but nonconceptually, yielding a “nonconceptual compassion” comparable to what Christians call “totally undivided oneness with God.” Lacking historical consciousness, however, teachers have tended to project their understanding of skillful means back on to Śākyamuni Buddha, each school assuming that other schools are merely preparations for itself. The same pattern is evident in the integration into Buddhism of indigenous religions such as Shintō, which enriched Buddhism but also assimilated it to themselves. Prompted by his contacts with Christian colleagues to venture beyond practice into Buddhist self-reflection, Makransky is now prepared to see in conceptions such as the Dharmakāya (“Dharma body” of the Buddha or ultimate reality) an equivalent of what Christians understand by God. The Body of Christ, with its implications for ecclesiology, could open up a further avenue for comparison.Existing under the conditions of late or post-modernity, Buddhism is forced to come to terms with pluralism and ecumenism. Prof. Kenneth Tanaka (Musashino University, Tokyo), an ordained Jōdo Shinshū priest, sees himself as incapable of saying to a non-Buddhist, “You’re not saved,” because the practice of prajñā and karunā (wisdom and compassion) is not restricted to Buddhists. Even within traditions, however, levels of spiritual attainment are not equivalent, nor are all religions equally valid. “Prophets can’t be pluralists,” but like... (shrink)

Emancipation is a legitimate human interest. It may be said that Foucault in his last works is concerned with putting forward a strategy for emancipation. The strategy consists in an aesthetic construction of the self. It is argued that this strategy ultimately fails and that, instead of retreating to the self, we need to return to the community level and to examine the rules of discourse that operate there. Contrary to Foucault's strategy, Habermas argues that what we need is a (...) communicative rationality capable of correcting discursive distortions. Coming from a different angle, Lyotard argues that what we need at the community level is a set of rules that prevent any one discourse totalizing all others. Such rules would ensure just gaming. Together, Lyotard and Habermas offer us an ethics that has the potential to serve the human interest in emancipation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 125 to such a future contingent event, not only does such an event not exist now, it does not even exist in its causes now, and this for the reason that no sufficient causes of the event exist now. Accordingly, if someone were merely to make a guess to the effect that the sea-fight will occur tomorrow, and the fight actually does occur, it still could not (...) be maintained that the original guess at the time it was made was therefore true. It simply could not have been true, because at the time of its assertion there literally was no evidence of any kind that could have rendered it true. Nevertheless, modern logicians have generally been so dead set against the notion that the truth or falsity of a proposition could ever be relative to the time when the proposition was uttered that they seem scarcely to have taken account of a consideration such as the foregoing. Nor is it likely that with the publication of this excellent translation of St. Thomas's commentary, such critics will begin to take account of this Thomistic argument even now. Somehow, one is reminded of Dr. Johnson's purported remark, "Sir, I can only give a man a reason, not an intelligence!" HENRY VEATCtt Northwestern University Pascal e Nietzsche. Scritti di E. Castelli, H. Gouhier, A. del Noce, H. Birault, K. Takeno, K. LSwith, J. D~lhomme, G. Vattimo, R. Boehm, G. Morra. (Padova: Cedam; Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1962. Pp. 218. = Archivio di Filosofia. Organo dell'Istituto di Studi Filosofici. Anno 1962. No 3. L. 2000.) This issue of the Archivio di Filosofia offers essays by the various authors indicated in the title above. Pascal and Nietzsche are here brought together because of what they have in common, that is, suffering, restlessness, dissatisfaction with the human condition, the historical sorrow of post-Copernican man, a paradoxical and chaotic thought. Both Pascal and Nietzsche urge man to measure the real by the possible and not the possible by the real and to risk the present certainties for the uncertainty of the future. They dislodge man from his ordinary seat and launch him on the risky adventure and great experiment of real existence. PA~L T. FUHRMANN Columbia Theological Seminary Pierre Bayle and Voltaire. By H. T. Mason. (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. xv -k 163.) Pierre Bayle and Voltaire confronts the ideas of the two philosophers and formulates some prudent conclusions about their relationship. Since Bayle's works run to nine long folio volumes and Voltaire's come to fifty quartos in the Moland edition, one cannot help but be impressed by the magnitude of Professor Mason's undertaking and by his ability to reduce his findings to a book of just over one hundred and fifty pages. In the case of Bayle and Voltaire, the basic facts concerning influence are readily available. We know what works of Bayle's were in the library at Ferney; we can see the pages the Enlightenment philosopher marked as he read; we have almost two hundred references to Bayle in Voltaire's works and letters (listed chronologically by Mason in an appendix); and critical editions, such as Morize's Candide and Lanson's Lettres philosophiques, have disclosed how consistently Voltaire turned to the Dictionnaire historique et critique or other works from Bayle's pen for information. Yet, when dealing with passages that seem to rely on Bayle for factual content, a scholar runs into many hazards. Voltaire may draw his data from Bayle, from Bayle's source, from an intermediary, or from an outside source. We know that he consulted Richard Simon, Spinoza, Dora Calmet, and Dr. Astruc as well as Bayle for his Biblical criticism. Therefore, it is very frequently impossible to be sure just how much Bayle's thinking... (shrink)

Retrospective rule-making has few supporters and many opponents. Defenders of retrospective laws generally do so on the basis that they are a necessary evil in specific or limited circumstances, for example to close tax loopholes, to deal with terrorists or to prosecute fallen tyrants. Yet the reality of retrospective rule making is far more widespread than this, and ranges from ’corrective’ legislation to ’interpretive regulations’ to judicial decision making. The search for a rational justification for retrospective rule-making necessitates a reconsideration (...) of the very nature of the rule of law and the kind of law that can rule, and will provide new insights into the nature of law and the parameters of societal order. This book examines the various ways in which laws may be seen as retrospective and analyses the problems in defining retrospectivity. In his analysis Dr Charles Sampford asserts that the definitive argument against retrospective rule-making is the expectation of individuals that, if their actions today are considered by a future court, the applicable law was discoverable at the time the action was performed. The book goes on to suggest that although the strength of this ’rule of law’ argument should prevail in general, exceptions are sometimes necessary, and that there may even be occasions when analysis of the rule of law may provide the foundation for the application of retrospective laws. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 125 to such a future contingent event, not only does such an event not exist now, it does not even exist in its causes now, and this for the reason that no sufficient causes of the event exist now. Accordingly, if someone were merely to make a guess to the effect that the sea-fight will occur tomorrow, and the fight actually does occur, it still could not (...) be maintained that the original guess at the time it was made was therefore true. It simply could not have been true, because at the time of its assertion there literally was no evidence of any kind that could have rendered it true. Nevertheless, modern logicians have generally been so dead set against the notion that the truth or falsity of a proposition could ever be relative to the time when the proposition was uttered that they seem scarcely to have taken account of a consideration such as the foregoing. Nor is it likely that with the publication of this excellent translation of St. Thomas's commentary, such critics will begin to take account of this Thomistic argument even now. Somehow, one is reminded of Dr. Johnson's purported remark, "Sir, I can only give a man a reason, not an intelligence!" HENRY VEATCtt Northwestern University Pascal e Nietzsche. Scritti di E. Castelli, H. Gouhier, A. del Noce, H. Birault, K. Takeno, K. LSwith, J. D~lhomme, G. Vattimo, R. Boehm, G. Morra. (Padova: Cedam; Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1962. Pp. 218. = Archivio di Filosofia. Organo dell'Istituto di Studi Filosofici. Anno 1962. No 3. L. 2000.) This issue of the Archivio di Filosofia offers essays by the various authors indicated in the title above. Pascal and Nietzsche are here brought together because of what they have in common, that is, suffering, restlessness, dissatisfaction with the human condition, the historical sorrow of post-Copernican man, a paradoxical and chaotic thought. Both Pascal and Nietzsche urge man to measure the real by the possible and not the possible by the real and to risk the present certainties for the uncertainty of the future. They dislodge man from his ordinary seat and launch him on the risky adventure and great experiment of real existence. PA~L T. FUHRMANN Columbia Theological Seminary Pierre Bayle and Voltaire. By H. T. Mason. (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pp. xv -k 163.) Pierre Bayle and Voltaire confronts the ideas of the two philosophers and formulates some prudent conclusions about their relationship. Since Bayle's works run to nine long folio volumes and Voltaire's come to fifty quartos in the Moland edition, one cannot help but be impressed by the magnitude of Professor Mason's undertaking and by his ability to reduce his findings to a book of just over one hundred and fifty pages. In the case of Bayle and Voltaire, the basic facts concerning influence are readily available. We know what works of Bayle's were in the library at Ferney; we can see the pages the Enlightenment philosopher marked as he read; we have almost two hundred references to Bayle in Voltaire's works and letters (listed chronologically by Mason in an appendix); and critical editions, such as Morize's Candide and Lanson's Lettres philosophiques, have disclosed how consistently Voltaire turned to the Dictionnaire historique et critique or other works from Bayle's pen for information. Yet, when dealing with passages that seem to rely on Bayle for factual content, a scholar runs into many hazards. Voltaire may draw his data from Bayle, from Bayle's source, from an intermediary, or from an outside source. We know that he consulted Richard Simon, Spinoza, Dora Calmet, and Dr. Astruc as well as Bayle for his Biblical criticism. Therefore, it is very frequently impossible to be sure just how much Bayle's thinking... (shrink)

‘No matter what the grievance, and I'm sure that the Palestinians have some legitimate grievances, nothing can justify the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians. If they were attacking our soldiers it would be a different matter.’ (Dr. Zvi Shtauber, Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, BBC Radio 4, May 1, 2003).

Background: More and more quantitative information is becoming available about the risks of complications arising from medical treatment. In everyday practice, this raises the question whether each and every risk, however low, should be disclosed to patients. What could be good reasons for doing or not doing so? This will increasingly become a dilemma for practitioners.Objective: To report doctors’ views on whether to disclose or withhold information on low risks of complications.Methods: In a qualitative study design, 37 respondents were included. (...) Focus group interviews were held with 22 respondents and individual in-depth interviews with 15.Results: Doctors have doubts about disclosing or withholding information on complication risk, especially in a risk range of 1 in 200 to 1 in 10 000. Their considerations on whether to disclose or to withhold information depend on a complicated mix of patient and doctor-associated reasons; on medical and personal considerations; and on the kind and purpose of intervention.Discussion: Even though the degree of a risk is important in a doctor’s considerations, the severity of the possible complications and patients’ wishes and competencies have an important role as well. Respondents said that low risks should always be communicated when there are alternatives for the intervention or when the patient may prevent or mitigate the risk. When the appropriateness of disclosing risks is doubtful, doctors should always tell their patients that no intervention is without risk, give them the opportunity to gather all the information they need or want, and enable them to detect a complication at an early stage. (shrink)

The research described here contributes to the extant empirical research on business ethics education by examining outcomes drawn from the literature on positive organizational scholarship (POS). The general research question explored is whether a course on ethical decision-making in business could positively influence students’ confidence in their abilities to handle ethical problems at work (i.e., moral efficacy), boost the relative importance of ethics in their work lives (i.e., moral meaningfulness), and encourage them to be more courageous in raising ethical problems (...) at work even if it is unpopular (i.e., moral courage). Specifically, the study used a rigorous quasi-experimental pretest–posttest research design with a treatment (N = 30) and control group (N = 30) to investigate whether a graduate-level course in business ethics could influence students’ levels of moral efficacy, meaningfulness, and courage. Findings revealed that participants in the business ethics treatment course experienced significant positive increases in each of the three outcome variables as compared to the control group. The largest increase was in moral efficacy, followed by moral courage, and finally, moral meaningfulness. These findings are discussed in the context of the current research on business ethics education and POS. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

PurposeThe main purpose of this study is to assess the effects of COVID-19 on the restaurant businesses of Bangladesh. It examines the socio-economic impacts of the humanitarian disaster of the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspective of restaurant owners. The study also intends to provide recommendations to mitigate effects on the restaurant business.Design/Methodology/ApproachA qualitative research approach was adopted to explore the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the restaurant businesses of Bangladesh. A total of 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with the (...) top-ranked restaurant owners in the Rajshahi City Corporation area of Bangladesh. Thematic analysis technique was applied for analyzing the collected data.FindingsThe study found that the restaurant owners were compelled to reduce their number of employees, and forced to ensure social distancing and proper sanitization which increased the expenses. Although online orders and home delivery services have increased significantly, restaurant business operation is gradually turning critical owing to the lack of financial support. Thus, restaurant owners urge the govenrment for financial assistance.Research Limitations/ImplicationsSince this research only focused on one city in Bangladesh, the outcomes of study may have a dearth of generalizability. Hence, the investigators are encouraged to extend the study area.Practical ImplicationsThis study will help restaurant owners and policymakers in formulating contemporary business policies and strategies. Thus, it will be supportive of improving the present condition of the restaurant businesses in developing countries like Bangladesh.Originality/ValueThis paper identified the truculent scenario of the restaurant business during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Ethical conduct is the hallmark of excellence in engineering and scientific research, design, and practice. While undergraduate and graduate programs in these areas routinely emphasize ethical conduct, few receive formal ethics training as part of their curricula. The first purpose of this research study was to assess the relative effectiveness of ethics education in enhancing individuals’ general knowledge of the responsible conduct of research practices and their level of moral reasoning. Secondly, we examined the effects of ethics education on the (...) positive psychological outcomes of perspective-taking, moral efficacy, moral courage, and moral meaningfulness. To examine our research hypotheses, we utilized a pretest–posttest quasi-experimental design consisting of three ethics education groups (control, embedded modules, and stand-alone courses). Findings revealed that both embedded and stand alone courses were effective in enhancing participants’ perspective-taking, moral efficacy, and moral courage. Moral meaningfulness was marginally enhanced for the embedded module condition. Moral judgment and knowledge of responsible conduct of research practices were not influenced by either ethics education condition. Contrary to expectations, stand alone courses were not superior to embedded modules in influencing the positive psychological outcomes investigated. Implications of these findings for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In three experiments, the relation between different modes of thought and the generation of “creative” and original ideas was investigated. Participants were asked to generate items according to a specific instruction . They either did so immediately after receiving the instruction, or after a few minutes of conscious thought, or after a few minutes of distraction during which “unconscious thought” was hypothesized to take place. Throughout the experiments, the items participants listed under “unconscious thought” conditions were more original. It was (...) concluded that whereas conscious thought may be focused and convergent, unconscious thought may be more associative and divergent. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in ethical competence-building within nursing and health care practising. This tendency is accompanied by a remarkable growth of ethical guidelines. Ethical demands have also been laid down in laws. Present-day practitioners and researchers in health care are thereby left in a virtual cross-fire of various legislations, codes, and recommendations, all intended to guide behaviour. The aim of this paper was to investigate the role of ethical guidelines in the process of ethical competence-building within health care (...) practice and medical research. A conceptual and critical philosophical analysis of some paragraphs of the Helsinki Declaration and of relevant literature was performed. Three major problems related to ethical guidelines were identified, namely, the interpretation problem (there is always a gap between the rule and the practice, which implies that ethical competence is needed for those who are to implement the guidelines); the multiplicity problem (the great number of codes, declarations, and laws might pull in different directions, which may confuse the health care providers who are to follow them); and the legalisation problem (ethics concerns may take on a legal form, where ethical reflection is replaced by a procedure of legal interpretations). Virtue ethics might be an alternative to a rule based approach. This position, however, can turn ethics into a tacit knowledge, leading to poorly reflected and inconsistent ethical decisions. Ethical competence must consist of both being (virtues) and doing (rules and principles), but also of knowing (critical reflection), and therefore a communicative based model is suggested. (shrink)

Articles on sentence in Sanskrit grammar according to Mimamsa philosophy.

A medical centre is an institution established for a specific purpose: to facilitate the health and health-related welfare of the medical centre's patients. Within this institution, there are a variety of professionals who act and interact to serve this purpose. Of particular interest is the interaction between physician and nurse. Generally, the nurse is thought to be under a certain obligation to implement a physician's orders unless there is good reason not to do so. This qualifier places a conflicting obligation (...) upon the nurse not to implement some physician orders. How should a judgement about which orders there is 'good reason' not to implement be made? I propose to approach this question through an analysis of the obligation the nurse has to implement the order of a physician, and the conditions under which the order does not pose such obligations. This analysis will consist of an examination of the obligation in terms of the purposive authority of the physician. For example, in the context of the medical centre, the physician's medical training qualifies her as best able to make determinations of what treatment would promote the patient's health. However, this purpose not only serves as the basis of the physician's authority, but also serves as a limitation upon the physician's authority (for example, an order which would harm the patient would not reflect the purpose for which the physician has been given authority). Thus, a philosophical investigation into the nature of the obligation to implement a physician's orders can help to clarify those occasions when a nurse should not implement an order. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the possible legal implications of the production, marketing and use of expert systems. The relevance of a legally useful definition of expert systems, comprising systems designed for use both by laymen and professionals, is related to the distinctions inherent in the legal doctrine underlying provision of goods and provision of services. The liability of the sellers and users of, and contributors to, expert systems are examined in terms of professional malpractice as well as product liability. (...) A recurring theme indicates that legislators may be inclined to restrict possibilities of liability suits in order to avoid disincentives to the creation of expert systems. (shrink)

This paper develops a model of the nurse/physician authority relationship presented in an earlier issue of this journal, and responds to criticisms raised against that model in commentaries on that article. Specifically, I examine the discrepancy which exists between medical knowledge and nursing education, and show this discrepancy to be a difference in type, not quality. The implication is that improvements in nursing education will not affect the authority relationship between physician and nurse. To affect this relationship the nature of (...) nursing education must change. (shrink)

Discussions in Germany regarding appropriate end-of-life decision-making have been heavily influenced by the liberalization of access to physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium. These discussions disclose conflicting moral views regarding the propriety of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, threatening conflicts within not only the medical profession, but also the mainline churches in Germany, whose membership now entertains views regarding end-of-life decision-making at odds with traditional Christian doctrine. On the surface, there appears to be a broad consensus (...) supporting the hospice movement and condemning physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. The German Supreme Court has held that treatment decisions should, in absence of known patients’ wishes, be made in light of commonly shared values, unless these violate the principle of “in dubio pro vita”. The Roman Catholic church and the Evangelical Lutheran church in Germany have developed an advance directive for treatment choices at the end of life, while condemning physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. This stance is in tension with the strong emerging support for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, a development that promises to open up foundational disagreements within mainline German Christianity regarding the appropriate approach to intentionally terminating human life. (shrink)